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3Executive Summary
From the terrorist attacks of September 11th to extreme weather events, a number of local di-
sasters have demonstrated that New York’s transportation network lacks the resiliency and re-
dundancy it needs to respond to emergency events and function effi  ciently in their aftermath. As 
climate change continues to fuel increasingly volatile weather patterns, New York City is likely to 
experience extreme weather events with greater frequency and severity, resulting in recurrent 
disruptions to safe and effi  cient transportation in New York City.
In addition to providing fast, effi  cient, and enjoyable public transportation under normal circum-
stances, ferries have consistently proven to be the most resilient mode of transit during and after 
emergencies. Lacking reliance on either a fi xed route or the electrical grid, ferries have historically 
been deployed for speedy evacuations from no-notice emergency situations. Moreover, ferries 
are typically the fi rst mode of transportation to resume service during prolonged transit outages, 
relieving New Yorkers—particularly in communities lacking bus and subway access—from an ex-
tended transit paralysis. 
In spite of ferries’ utility in emergency management, they are presently underutilized in New York’s 
waterways. " is paper is a call to action to policymakers and city offi  cials to redefi ne ferries as criti-
cal emergency management assets. In doing so, the City will not only be equipped for a robust, 
interconnected ferry transit network, but it will also be prepared to faciliate eff ective waterborne 
evacuation and transit recovery. " is paper makes eight key recommendations for maximizing the 
role of ferries in citywide emergency preparedness:
1. Increase capacity for waterborne evacuation by expanding inter-borough ferry service.
2. Provide ferry crews with emergency personnel identifi cation.
3. Prioritize reimbursements to ferry operators when allocating federal and state emergency 
relief funds.
4. Fully integrate ferries with mass transit to facilitate seamless regional mobility. 
5. Coordinate all regional ferry infrastructure—including all boats and landings—as one unifi ed 
system of emergency management.
6. Develop coastal design standards to equip New York’s shoreline for emergency response.
7. Establish a Department of the Waterfront—a new city agency—and house a Waterfront 
Emergency Management division within it to coordinate long-term planning and prepared-
ness eff orts.
8. Considering ferries as essential emergency management assets, apply for government emer-
gency preparedness and recovery grants for coastal retrofi tting and additional tie-up sites. 
4Introduction
" e Hudson River rushing into the Brooklyn-Bat-
tery Tunnel. Roofs of taxicabs piercing the sur-
face of rising fl oodwaters. Subway tunnels and 
primary avenues reminiscent of Venetian canals. 
" ese haunting images of Superstorm Sandy’s 
strength are a reminder that, as a waterfront city, 
New York’s surface and rail transportation remains 
highly vulnerable to disasters. It is critical, however, 
that transportation systems operate smoothly in 
the wake of a natural or manmade disaster, since 
power outages and public health risks often neces-
sitate speedy evacuations. As extreme weather events continue to grow in frequency and sever-
ity, it is essential that New York adapt its transit network so it is suffi  ciently prepared to respond to, 
and recover from, emergency events. 
Recent transit outages have proved that a redundant transportation system is a resilient trans-
portation system. And ferries—a fast, effi  cient, and appealing mode of transit under normal opera-
tion—become indispensable in the wake of emergencies. Since the beginning of the 21st century, 
a number of urgent events prompting transit shutdowns—including the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11th, the 2003 blackout, the 2005 transit strike, the 2007 summer storm, and, most re-
cently, Superstorm Sandy—have demonstrated that ferries can still operate (when the waters are 
calm enough) and provide vital redundancy when other transit modes become inoperative. When 
electricity fails, subway tunnels fl ood, trees and debris obstruct roads and train tracks, and river 
crossings suff er paralyzing congestion, ferries continue to crisscross waterways, evacuating resi-
dents from the water’s edge in hard-hit neighborhoods and maintaining regional mobility during 
extended recovery periods. 
" is paper calls upon City offi  cials and policymakers to redefi ne ferries as essential emergency 
management assets. It is divided into three parts. First, “Assessing Risks and Impacts” lays out 
a number of vulnerabilities specifi c to New York City that place its transportation infrastructure 
at a high risk of malfunction during emergencies. Second, “How Ferries Help” details ferries’ abil-
ity to fi ll transit service gaps during and following emergencies. Finally, “Challenges and Solutions” 
outlines strategies for maximizing the utility of ferries during disaster response and recovery. By 
recognizing ferries’ critical role in emergency management, and integrating them into long-term 
emergency preparedness planning, policymakers will ensure that New Yorkers can enjoy ferries 
under normal circumstances and depend upon them when disaster strikes. 
“Restoring the [transit] system was vital to restoring the economic 
and social pulse of the city.”¹
Victor Mendez, Federal Highway Administrator
Record storm surge fl ooded upland areas during Sandy.
Source: NY Daily News
1. Victor Mendez, “Planning for Resiliency: Adapting the Transportation System to Emerging Vulnerabilities.” (presentation, NYMTC 
Annual Meeting, New York, NY, February 26, 2013).
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In recent years, emergency events prompting system-wide transit shutdowns, once a relatively 
rare occurrence, have become anticipated realities of urban life (see Appendix 1). In fact, in the his-
tory of New York City, transit offi  cials have only preemptively suspended service in advance of 
extreme weather twice: in August 2011, prior to Hurricane Irene, and in October 2012, before Su-
perstorm Sandy. In the short term, transit outages can quickly produce public health crises—with 
residents left stranded in inundated areas without electricity, medical care, or essential supplies—
while extended or indefi nite shutdowns often result in signifi cant economic losses for businesses, 
employees, and government agencies, whose staff s must work around the clock to restore transit 
as quickly as possible. In addition, communities most likely to suff er long-term impacts of disasters 
tend to be isolated waterfront neighborhoods with few transportation options.  
Whether caused by natural or man-made disasters, these situations have repeatedly exposed a 
number of weaknesses in New York’s transportation infrastructure that hamper functional opera-
tion both during and following emergency events:
• Limited egress across waterways: New York is a city of islands and peninsulas with a limited 
number of crossing points among the boroughs. When power fails, or bridges and tunnels 
become unsafe for travel, evacuation across the rivers can become a chaotic, time-con-
suming, and potentially dangerous process. " is issue is further compounded by the fact 
that New York’s 520-mile coastline, with inconsistent waterfront access and a shortage of 
landing and tie-up sites, is not suffi  ciently equipped to facilitate large-scale emergency wa-
terborne evacuations.
• Lack of transit redundancy:  A number of 
neighborhoods in New York City, particu-
larly the rapidly growing districts along 
the waterfront, must contend with limited 
options for public transportation that are 
already strained beyond their capacity. 
" is lack of transit redundancy can deter 
evacuation eff orts and lead to prolonged 
disruptions to mobility when the City’s 
transit system—or portions of it—become 
incapacitated.
• Fixed-route transportation system: New 
Yorkers rely on roads, bridges, tunnels, 
and trains for travel under normal circum-
stances, yet these fi xed-route modes of 
transportation are currently limited in their 
ability to facilitate evacuation during emergency events. " is is particularly problematic for 
isolated waterfront neighborhoods with limited means of egress.
A pumping train removes fl oodwater out of Cranberry 
Street tunnel following Sandy.
Source: MTA
6• Low-lying infrastructure: " e low elevation of New York’s transportation infrastructure—in-
cluding trains, roadways, and tunnels—creates a perennial risk of extreme fl ooding. Repairs 
of inundated infrastructure can be heavily delayed if an excess of saltwater enters tunnels, 
as salt deposits can corrode equipment and necessitate expensive, time-consuming re-
placements.²  
• Climate change: With temperatures and sea levels rising and severe weather events project-
ed to occur more frequently, coastal cities like New York—with an extremely high population 
density, a proliferation of low-lying neighborhoods, aging infrastructure, and a “heat island” 
eff ect—face particularly signifi cant risks from climate change (see Appendix 2). Accordingly, 
New York can expect to see more frequent and prolonged transit outages in the future. 
Part I: Assessing Risks and Impacts (cont’d)
2. Sarah Kaufman, et al. Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy. (New York: NYU Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public 
Service, 2012), 14.
7Part II: How Ferries Help
Ferries have become highly popular in New York City in recent years, owing to their demonstrated 
eff ectiveness as a means of transit, an engine of economic development, and a tourist attraction. 
Whereas ferries had all but disappeared from New York City’s waters by the 1970s, today the de-
mand for water mass transit is growing steadily, with enthusiastic support from policymakers, city 
offi  cials, and the public. " e same qualities that make ferries eff ective as a form of public transpor-
tation under normal circumstances—namely their fl exibility, adaptability, and the ease with which 
they can be mobilized—make them indispensable during emergency events. In the last decade, the 
increasing number of ferry vessels in New York’s waters has been critical to waterborne emer-
gency response and recovery.⁴ 
Immediate Emergency Response 
As waterborne vessels, ferries are relatively immune to many of the obstacles that can cripple rail-
and-road transit infrastructure such as power outages, obstructed roads, and impassable bridges 
or tunnels. As a result, even under the most challenging circumstances, ferries can be quickly mo-
bilized from across the region to reach disaster victims who have been completely disconnected 
from the transit network. For instance, on January 15, 2009, ferries proved vital to the rescue of the 
155 passengers aboard US Airways 
Flight 1529, which made a sudden 
emergency landing in the Hudson 
River after striking a fl ock of geese. 
Minutes after the plane touched 
down, NY Waterway deployed three 
ferries to the aircraft—followed by a 
convoy of tugboats, police, fi re, and 
Coast Guard vessels—to achieve a 
successful rescue of all passengers 
on board.⁵
“Resilience means creating diversity and redundancy in our systems 
and rewiring their interconnections, which enables their functioning 
even when individual parts fail.”³
Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, NYS 2100 Commission Co-Chairs
3. Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, foreword to NYS 2100: Recommendations to Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire 
State’s Infrastructure (2013), 6.
4. New York City Economic Development Corporation. Maritime Support Services Location Study. (New York: Economic Development 
Corporation, 2007) , 80.
5. Robert D. McFadden. “Pilot Is Hailed After Jetliner’s Icy Plunge.” ! e New York Times. January 15, 2009, accessed March 8, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/nyregion/16crash.html.
Ferries successfully rescued the passengers of US Airways Flight 1529.
Source: Sacramento Bee
8Long-Term Recovery 
Lacking a strictly fi xed route, during extended transit outages ferry operators can quickly plan 
new service to areas in need by utilizing temporary landings and adding vessels with the help of 
emergency funding. Moreover, owing to their minimal reliance on either hard infrastructure or the 
electrical grid, ferries are typically the fi rst mode of transportation to resume operation following 
emergency events. In the case of Superstorm Sandy, though many subway lines remained closed 
for a week, ferries resumed service the next day, providing quick and effi  cient mobility across the 
East and Hudson Rivers (see Appendix3). Most important, in comparison to road and rail, new ferry 
infrastructure can be built relatively quickly and aff ordably, opening vital transportation arteries to 
hard-hit neighborhoods in a matter of weeks. For instance, in order to accommodate the sudden 
twofold increase in ferry ridership following September 11th, the Port Authority constructed a new 
landing in Battery Park in just six weeks, costing $4 million. By contrast, rebuilding the destroyed 
PATH infrastructure between New Jersey and Manhattan required two years of labor and more 
than $320 million in capital funding.⁶
Part II: How Ferries Help (cont’d)
6. New York City Economic Development Corporation, Comprehensive Citywide Ferry Study, 158.  
9September 11th, 2001: # e largest maritime evacuation in history
What happened:
" e collapse of the Twin Towers necessitated the rapid evacuation of Lower Manhattan. However, 
with subways shut down and river crossings either blockaded or clogged with frenetic crowds, 
millions of people found themselves trapped on the tip of Manhattan. Panicked and disoriented 
crowds instinctively fl ed to the waterfront in hopes of fi nding a way off  the island.⁷ " ey quickly 
found boats to be their only mode of transportation. " ereafter, nearly 17% of those fl eeing the 
attacks identifi ed ferries as among the means of transit they used to reach their fi nal destina-
tions—more than buses, subways, or emergency vehicles.⁸  
How ferries helped:
Not long after the towers fell, the Coast Guard ra-
dioed the message, “All available boats…anyone 
to help with the evacuation of Lower Manhattan, 
report to Governors Island.”⁹  Moments later, hun-
dreds of boats raced across the harbor toward the 
enormous cloud of smoke and ash engulfi ng Low-
er Manhattan. Ferries, cruise boats, and even tug-
boats that were not designed to carry passengers 
shuttled evacuees from the shores of Lower Man-
hattan to destinations in the outer boroughs and 
New Jersey.¹⁰  Owing to their ability to seek out 
those in need and transport them across the rivers, ferries and other marine vessels facilitated the 
largest water-based evacuation in human history, transporting nearly half a million people from 
Lower Manhattan in less than nine hours.¹¹   
" e return to transit normalcy following September 11th was a long and costly process. " e World 
Trade Center attacks destroyed roughly 1,800 feet of subway tunnel, damaged critical infrastruc-
ture, and overwhelmed Lower Manhattan’s transit network with debris. Repairs and cleanup ex-
ceeded $850 million, while new security measures and the reconstruction of the World Trade 
Center PATH station cost an additional $2 billion.¹²  Concurrently, to compensate for lost transit 
capacity, the City quickly developed a more redundant system with more than a dozen new ferry 
lines that carried more than twice the average number of waterborne passengers. " is ridership 
spike continued for more than two years until the resumption of PATH service in late 2003.¹³
Ferries and other maritime vessels facilitated the largest 
waterborne evacuation in history on September 11th.
Source: ReelGoddess.com
7. Boalift, an Untold Tale of 9/11 resilience. Directed by Eddie Rosenstein. Eyepop Productions, 2011.
8. Rae Zimmerman, and Martin F. Sherman. “To Leave an Area After Disaster: How Evacuees from the WTC Buildings Left the WTC Area 
Following the Attacks.” (New York: NYU Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, 2010), 8. 
9. Boatlift.
10. Jessica DuLong. “" e Untold Story of Tround Zero Evacuations by Boat.” Huffi  ngton Post. September 13, 2011, accessed March 6, 
2013, http://www.huffi  ngtonpost.com/jessica-dulong/the-untold-story-of-groun_b_955893.html.
11. Boatlift.
12. Carl H. McCall. ! e Impact of the World Trade Center Tragedy on the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. (New York City: Offi  ce of 
the State Comptroller, 2001), 1-2.
13. New York City Economic Development Corporation. Comprehensive Citywide Ferry Study. (New York: Economic Development 
Corporation, 2010), 158. 
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After Superstorm Sandy – How ferries kept New York moving
“Hurricane Sandy and its impact on transportation also provided a timely message to all New 
Yorkers that public transportation is essential to the economic and social well being of the people 
who live, work and visit here.” — NYU Rudin Center for Transportation¹⁴
What happened:
Superstorm Sandy plainly demonstrated the impacts 
of climate change on the City’s already vulnerable tran-
sit system. Largely located in low-lying coastal areas, 
the City’s transportation network shut down as rising 
fl oodwaters fi lled underground tunnels and signifi cantly 
damaged electrical equipment. " e complete saturation 
of the Brooklyn-Battery and Queens-Midtown Tunnels 
made them impassable for days after the storm, while 
the unprecedented inundation of subway tunnels sub-
stantially delayed cleanup and repair eff orts.¹⁵  Moreover, 
as bridges, tunnels, and subway lines gradually reopened 
in a piecemeal fashion, the City’s transit network witnessed levels of congestion “reminiscent of 
scenes from Sao Paulo and Jakarta: emerging megacities that struggle to provide adequate capac-
ity…in their urban cores.”¹⁶  According to a survey conducted by the Rudin Center for Transporta-
tion at New York University, residents of Manhattan and Brooklyn saw their commute times nearly 
double in the days following Sandy, while Staten Islanders’ commutes increased nearly threefold.¹⁷
How ferries helped:
The extensive transit recovery period following Superstorm Sandy clearly demonstrated ferries’ 
unique ability to quickly adapt to emergency circumstances and help New Yorkers resume their 
daily lives. To help restore mobility to some of the City’s hardest-hit neighborhoods, the New York 
City Economic Development Corporation and the Department of Transportation partnered with 
private operators Seastreak and New York Water Taxi to implement temporary, rush-hour ferry 
service from Rockaway Park, Queens, and Great Kills, Staten Island, into Manhattan. ¹⁸¹⁹  In both 
cases, the City constructed temporary ferry landings and allowed commuters to travel to Manhat-
tan for a low one-way fare of $2. Additionally, in order to facilitate easier access to the waterfront, 
the City made free parking available near the landing sites, while the MTA ran free shuttle bus ser-
vice between the Great Kills ferry and the busy Hylan Boulevard bus routes. These improvised fer-
ry routes and upland connections allowed otherwise stranded New Yorkers to resume their com-
mutes following what Chairman Lhota called the most severe transit crisis in the City’s history. ²⁰
Ferries restored mobility to hard-hit areas such 
as Great Kills, Staten Island.
Source: nyc.gov
14. Kaufman, et al., Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy, 2. 
15. Kaufman, et al., Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy, 16. 
16. Ibid., 11. 
17. Ibid., 26. 
18. New York City Economic Development Corporation. New Rockaway Ferry Service. January 18, 2013, accessed March 6, 2013, http://
www.nycedc.com/blog-entry/new-rockaway-ferry-service.
19. New York City Department of Transportation. Great Kills Ferry. November 2012, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dot/html/ferrybus/greatkills.shtml.
20. Mark Duell and Jill Reilly. “FIFTY DEAD...and It’s NOT Over.” Mail Online. October 29, 2012, accessed March 6, 2013. http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2225108/Hurricane-Sandy-2012-pictures-FIFTY-DEAD--NOT-over.html.
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Part III: Challenges and Solutions
In spite of their proven utility as a mode of transit in both normal and emergency circumstances, 
the City has not yet maximized ferries’ potential for either public transportation or emergency 
management. " is section identifi es a number of existing challenges that hinder the optimization 
of ferries and recommends actionable solutions to integrate them into comprehensive planning for 
public transit and emergency management.
1. Challenge: Available ferry assets do not provide suf-
fi cient capacity to meet demand in emergency situ-
ations. During disaster events, New Yorkers instinc-
tively fl ock to piers and landings, waiting in long lines to 
board ferries and rescue boats.²¹ Time and again, this 
phenomenon leads to overcrowding, delays, and ineffi  -
ciencies as available vessels are overwhelmed by pas-
senger demand.
Solution: Increase capacity for waterborne evacuation 
by expanding inter-borough ferry service. Following 
the 2003 blackout, the Mayor’s Offi  ce convened an 
Emergency Management Task Force to analyze city 
agency response to the event. " e Task Force strongly 
recommended that New York City “explore all ave-
nues to supplement ferry service during emergency 
situations.”²²  In the wake of Superstorm Sandy, the 
Rudin Center for Transportation at New York Universi-
ty called for expanded commuter ferry service in New 
York City, arguing that adding more inter-borough fer-
ry routes would mitigate vehicular and transit conges-
tion.²³ " is is crucial because ferries’ ability to provide 
redundancy in contingencies is greatly aff ected by the 
availability of vessels and landings in New York’s wa-
terways. Given the rapid population growth projected 
in coming decades—with nearly a million new New 
Yorkers expected by 2030²⁴ —the best way to achieve 
these investments is to expand citywide ferry service. 
Growing water mass transit will strengthen the City’s 
capacity for waterborne evacuation and the eff ective-
ness of its emergency response.
21. Boatlift.
22. New York City Emergency Response Task Force. Enhancing New York City’s Emergency Preparedness: A Report to Mayor Michael 
R. Bloomberg. (New York, October 2003), 23.
23. Kaufman, et al., Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy, 31. 
24. New York City Offi  ce of Long Term Planning and Sustainability. PlaNYC Update April 2011. (New York: Offi  ce of the Mayor, 2011),  5. 
Ferry ridership spiked after Sandy.
Source: ctvnews.ca
Expanding ferry service—increasing the 
number of boats in the harbor—is key to 
emergency preparedness. 
Source: Keith Sherwood
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2. Challenge: Ferry crews lack the credentials necessary to gain access to disaster areas. Ferry 
crews are vital to waterborne evacuation eff orts. However, during emergencies police offi  -
cers and emergency response offi  cials may deny them access to blockaded roads and river 
crossings—delaying their ability to get to their vessels—or prohibit them from entering disas-
ter areas.²⁵
Solution: Provide ferry crews with emergency personnel identifi cation. In addition to the 
Transit Workers Identifi cation Credential (TWIC) card, ferry crews must be supplied with a 
form of identifi cation that designates them as essential emergency personnel. Police offi  cers 
and other offi  cials will then recognize them as integral to emergency response, enabling them 
to eff ectively fulfi ll their evacuation duties.
3. Challenge: Private ferry companies are often forced to operate at a fi nancial loss during no-
notice emergency events. When private companies’ ferry fl eets are called upon in a no-no-
tice emergency evacuation—such as September 11th, the 2003 blackout, or the Miracle on 
the Hudson—they will likely have to provide rapid and prolonged service at no charge.
Solution: Prioritize reimbursements to ferry operators when allocating federal and state 
emergency relief funds. In the San Francisco Bay Area, the Water Emergency Transporta-
tion Authority (WETA), the regional authority responsible for both regular ferry service and 
waterborne emergency transportation, collects fares from passengers whenever possible. 
However, when fare collection is impractical, the agency works with FEMA and the California 
state government to receive retroactive payments for fare-free emergency operations.²⁶  Giv-
en New York City’s heavy reliance on private ferry operators for the provision of emergency 
transportation services, the City should assume a leading role in coordinating reimbursements 
for fuel, labor, and any damages incurred and ensure that they occur in a timely manner. 
Part III: Challenges and Solutions (cont’d)
25. Tom Fox. “Gaps in Maritime Emergency Evacuation Infrastructure and Planning, and Suggested Solutions.” (Brooklyn, NY: 
Harbor Experience Companies, December 14, 2009), 3. 
26. San Francisco Bay Area Water Emergency Transportation Authority. Emergency Water Transportation System Management 
Plan. (San Francisco: WETA, 2009), 24. 
27. San Francisco Bay Area Water Emergency Transportation Authority, Emergency Water Transportation System Management 
Plan, 13. 
Case Study: WETA
The San Francisco Bay Area—a region that, similar to New York, is surrounded by water on all 
sides—presents an effective paradigm for waterborne emergency management. Prior to 2007, 
San Francisco’s Water Transit Authority (WTA) was the government agency responsible for man-
aging and operating the region’s extensive water mass transit network. However, after a number 
of incidents in which ferries proved critical to emergency response and recovery efforts, in 2007 
San Francisco replaced the WTA with the Water Emergency Transportation Authority (WETA). To-
day, as San Francisco’s official provider of both ferry transportation and waterborne emergency 
response, WETA not only manages ferry operations under normal circumstances but also mobi-
lizes its resources to implement waterborne evacuations across the bays to nine coastal counties 
in emergency events.²⁷
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4. Challenge: Connectivity from the water’s edge to points further inland is limited. Despite the 
marked population growth of waterfront neighborhoods in New York City, most of the City’s 
residents still live further inland, where upland connectivity is key to water mass transit utility. 
However, a signifi cant disjuncture exists between ferries and mass transit, discouraging ferry 
ridership and fostering the perception of ferries as a nonviable mode of public transportation, 
both in good times and under emergency circumstances.
Solution: Fully integrate ferries with mass transit to facilitate seamless regional mobility. " e 
incorporation of ferries into the City’s mass transit system will enhance their eff ectiveness 
both during normal service and following emergencies when river crossings are incapacitated. 
For instance, displaying ferry routes on MTA subway and regional rail maps will reinforce fer-
ries as part of the public transportation network and direct passengers to multi-modal transit 
hubs such as Long Island City, which off ers upland connections from the East River Ferry via 
subway, bus, and the Long Island Railroad (LIRR). Smartphone applications can synthesize this 
data to assist travelers on-the-go. Moreover, better synchronization between ferry and train 
schedules will facilitate faster and more effi  cient travel throughout the city. " is would also 
improve connectivity at stations like the Long Island City LIRR stop, which only operates at 
peak hours and precludes midday and weekend connections to ferries. Finally, an integrated 
payment system—through which passengers could purchase fares for subways, regional rail, 
and ferries—would be the most signifi cant integrative enhancement to ferry service. With just 
one versatile card, riders would no longer perceive ferries as distinct from transit; rather they 
would recognize them as a viable commuting option during both normal operations and ex-
tended transit outages.
5. Challenge: Inconsistencies in New York’s ferry infra-
structure complicate and delay emergency proce-
dures. Even with proper coordination, mass water-
borne evacuations may be hampered by a shortage 
of berthing space and inconsistently confi gured land-
ings. For example, the East 35th Street ferry landing, 
the primary point of waterborne egress on the East 
Side of Manhattan, can accommodate up to four ves-
sels at a time, while the Hunters Point ferry termi-
nal, located directly across the river from East 35th 
Street, has berthing space for just one boat.²⁸ During 
an emergency, this can result in prolonged queuing and overcrowding. Moreover, while high-
capacity vessels are highly eff ective during emergency evacuations, many ferry landings, 
particularly those on the East River, are too small to accommodate them. For instance, Sea-
streak’s fl eet boasts four 505-passenger ferries, among the highest-capacity passenger 
vessels in the New York Harbor. However, New York’s waterways lack suffi  cient landing sites 
large enough for these essential boats to dock.
Part III: Challenges and Solutions (cont’d)
28. Fox, “Emergency Evacuation,” 2. 
Ferry piers experienced severe overcrowd-
ing during the 2003 blackout.
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Solution: Coordinate all regional ferry infrastructure—including all boats and landings—as 
one unifi ed system of emergency management. By creating symmetrical capacity at ferry 
landings, the City can ensure that all boats departing from one side of the river will be able 
to quickly and eff ectively transport evacuees to safety and, if necessary, turn back and pick 
up additional passengers. Moreover, coordinating landing and ferry capacities will enable more 
seamless, effi  cient evacuations in which all involved vessels can safely transport New Yorkers 
to the greatest number of points along the coast.
6. Challenge: New York’s coastline is insuffi  ciently 
equipped to facilitate waterborne vessel access dur-
ing emergencies. Legal regulations require that all air-
planes, public buildings, and subway cars be equipped 
with unobstructed emergency exits to allow for quick 
and safe evacuations. However, though fringed with 
a 520-mile coastline, New York City lacks analogous 
requirements for waterborne evacuation points.²⁹  " e 
vast majority of New York City’s marine edge either 
precludes public access entirely or is designed for pas-
sive use, while opportunities for active maritime use 
and water access are extremely limited. For instance, 
on September 11th, owing to the insuffi  ciency of cleats, 
ladders, and gangways along the edge of Lower Man-
hattan, many rescue boats tied up to trees and other makeshift anchors, while evacuees 
were forced to jump several feet down from the water’s edge into rescue boats.³⁰
Solution: Develop coastal design standards to equip New York’s shoreline for emergency re-
sponse. Design guidelines should call for the retrofi tting of the City’s coastline with landings, 
gangways, cleats, and bollards at strategic points to ensure ample tie-up opportunities. Wa-
terfront neighborhoods with a particular dearth in both public transportation and landing fa-
cilities should be prioritized for new infrastructure, while existing infrastructure—regardless of 
present use or future development plans—should be preserved in order to ensure that ferries 
and other emergency vessels can safely receive and transport passengers during evacua-
tions. To help achieve these goals, the City should seek a commitment from permitting agen-
cies to support new coastal infrastructure that is large enough to accommodate an adequate 
number of appropriately sized vessels.
7. Challenge:  Responsibility for preparing the waterfront for long-term transit outages is frag-
mented across a variety of government agencies. When an emergency situation disrupts 
New York’s transit system, responsibility for transporting New Yorkers across the rivers 
diff uses across a diversity of government agencies. For instance, the Offi  ce of Emergency 
Management responds to the immediate impacts of an emergency; the Coast Guard controls 
on-water communications and protocol; and the New York Police Department handles secu-
rity at piers that are constructed by the Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) and 
Part III: Challenges and Solutions (cont’d)
29. Fox, “Emergency Evacuation,” 6. 
30. Boatlift. 
Emergency response to September 11th 
demonstrated that the City’s edge is ill-
equipped for waterborne evacuation.
Source: Metropolitan Waterfront Alliance
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maintained by the NYC Department of Transportation.³¹ " is intricate web of governmental 
authority has worked to facilitate some impromptu evacuations, but it neglects long-term 
issues of emergency preparedness planning.
Solution: Establish a Department of the Waterfront—a new city agency—and house a Wa-
terfront Emergency Management division within it to coordinate long-term planning and 
preparedness eff orts. Since the release of the Comprehensive Waterfront Plan in 2011, the 
Metropolitan Waterfront Alliance has pushed for the establishment of a Department of the 
Waterfront, a new city agency dedicated exclusively to managing the City’s 520 miles of coast-
line. " e agency would be tasked with integrating “permitting, maintenance, public and user 
participation processes, interagency coordination, and waterfront leadership to achieve long-
term waterfront goals—in particular the goals and objectives articulated in the newly updated 
New York City Comprehensive Waterfront Plan.”³²  " is interdisciplinary agency would house 
a Waterfront Emergency Management Division that would coordinate various city agencies 
to ensure that the City’s waterways are equipped for emergency events. Specifi cally, the Wa-
terfront Emergency Management Division would streamline ferry infrastructure planning to 
implement coastal design standards and ensure symmetrical capacity at all ferry landings.
8. Challenge: Insuffi  cient funding is available to expand water mass transit. " ough ferries pos-
sess signifi cant potential to both enhance New York’s public transportation network and pre-
pare the City for emergency events, in an era of chronic budget cuts, funding for even the 
most essential services can be scant.
Solution: Considering ferries as essential emergency management assets, apply for govern-
ment emergency preparedness and recovery grants for coastal retrofi tting and additional 
tie-up sites. It is presently a fi nancially propitious time to invest in ferry infrastructure, as a 
host of new federal emergency preparedness and recovery grants may be available to help 
subsidize the construction of new ferry terminals and the creation of additional tie-up sites. 
For example, in July 2012, the Obama Administration worked with Congress to pass the Mov-
ing Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), which commits $105 billion in fi scal 
years 2013 and 2014 to transportation projects.³³ Moreover, to help states and localities re-
cover from Superstorm Sandy, the U.S. government has allocated $60 billion for disaster relief 
and preparedness, $50 billion of which will be disseminated through various Federal agencies 
by decree of H.R.152, the offi  cial Sandy supplemental funding bill. In fact, this funding stream 
has already benefi ted New York City’s ferries, with $22 million going to the NYC Department 
of Transportation, for preparedness work and free shuttle bus service, and the Economic De-
velopment Corporation, for extended ferry service along the East River and to the Rockaway 
Peninsula.³⁴  A selection of emergency preparedness grant opportunities that may be relevant 
is listed on the following page.
Part III: Challenges and Solutions (cont’d)
31. Regional Plan Association. Ferries in the Region: Challenges and Opportunities. (New York: Regional Plan Association. 2006), 20.
32. Metropolitan Waterfront Alliance. Retooling Waterfront Governance in the New York-New Jersey Harbor. (New York: Metropolitan 
Waterfront Alliance, 2013).
33. U.S. Department of Transportation. MAP-21. 2012, accessed March 15, 2013. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/map21.
34. Joseph Straw. “Capitol Hill Will Provide $22 Million for City Ferry Service Post-Sandy Recovery.” NY Daily News. March 28, 
2013, accessed March 28, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/feds-include-22m-sandy-relief-city-ferry-services-
article-1.1301040.
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Funding Source (Respon-
sible Federal Agency)
Program Amount Duration Purpose Ferry Eligibility
MAP-21 (Department of 
Transportation)
Section 5324 
Public Transpor-
tation Emergency 
Relief Program
$2 billion N/A To fund capital projects to pro-
tect, replace, or repair infra-
structure that sustained dam-
age due to emergency events. 
To fund operating expenses 
related to evacuation, rescue, 
temporary transit service, or 
re-routing of service.³⁵
Section 5324 funds may help 
to reimburse private ferry op-
erators for revenue lost during 
fare-free evacuations. Section 
5324 can also fi nance tempo-
rary ferry service to hard-hit 
areas such as the Rockaway 
Peninsula and Staten Island. 
MAP-21 (Department of 
Transportation)
Ferry Boat Pro-
gram
$67 million Available until 
expended
To fund the construction of 
publicly owned (or majority 
publicly owned) ferry boats 
and ferry terminal facilities.³⁶
" e publicly subsidized East 
River Ferry could apply for 
MAP-21 funding to fi nance 
new landings and service 
expansion. 
U.S. Congress, H.R. 152: 
Hurricane Sandy Supple-
mental Funding (Depart-
ment of Transportation)
Federal Transit 
Administration 
Public Transpor-
tation Emergency 
Relief Program
$5.4 billion Available until 
expended
To fund transit systems af-
fected by Hurricane Sandy.³⁷
In areas where Sandy severely 
impacted transit, FTA funding 
can fi nance ferry redundancy. 
U.S. Congress, H.R. 
152: Hurricane Sandy 
Supplemental Funding 
(Department of Housing 
and Urban Development)
Community De-
velopment Block 
Grants (CDBG)
$3.85 billion Funds avail-
able until 
9/30/2017
To fund “necessary expenses 
related to disaster relief, long-
term recovery, restoration of 
infrastructure and housing, 
and economic revitalization 
in the most impacted and 
distressed areas…”³⁸
In low-income areas where 
Sandy severely impacted 
transit infrastructure, HUD 
CDBG funds can fi nance re-
dundant ferries both as public 
transportation and engines 
of economic development. 
Funding decisions are largely 
determined by the City of New 
York.
U.S. Congress, H.R. 152: 
Hurricane Sandy Supple-
mental Funding (Federal 
Emergency Management 
Agency)
FEMA Disaster 
Relief Fund
$11.487 billion Available until 
expended
To fund operations,
mitigation, and emergency 
measures.³⁹
FEMA funds may be used to 
fi nance ferries as transporta-
tion redundancy to hard-hit 
areas, as well as preparedness 
measures such as additional 
boats and tie-up sites. 
Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, 2012 
(Department of Homeland 
Security)
Transit Security 
Grant Program
$87.5 million 24 months To protect critical transit 
infrastructure from acts of 
terrorism and to make transit 
systems more resilient.⁴⁰
As ferries are critical to mass 
evacuation procedures, 
Homeland Security funding 
can fi nance emergency pre-
paredness infrastructure such 
as ferry boats and landside 
tie-up infrastructure.
Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, 2012 
(Department of Homeland 
Security)
Port Security 
Grant Program
$97.5 million 24 months To fund the implementation 
of Area Maritime Transporta-
tion Security Plans and facility 
security plans among port 
authorities, facility operators, 
and state and local govern-
ment agencies.⁴¹
Homeland Security funding 
can fi nance a marine security 
plan that incorporates ferries 
as essential to emergency 
response and recovery eff orts. 
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35. Federal Transit Administration. “Fact Sheet: Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program Section 5324.” MAP-21. 2012, 
accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/MAP-21_Fact_Sheet_-_Public_Transportation_Emergency_Relief_
Program.pdf.
36. Federal Highway Administration. “Federal-Aid Highway Funding of Ferry Boats and Ferry Terminal Facilities.” December 5, 2012, 
accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/specialfunding/fbp/primer.pdf .
37. U.S. Congress. “H.R. 152.” Washington, D.C., 2013.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Federal Emergency Management Authority. “Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) Frequently Asked 
Questions.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012.
41. Federal Emergency Management Authority. “Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) Frequently Asked 
Questions.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012.
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Conclusion
Superstorm Sandy provided yet another reminder that New York City is indeed a waterfront town. 
" ough among its greatest assets, the City’s waterways can place New Yorkers at risk of fl ooding 
during extreme weather and make for dangerous mobility within the urban archipelago both dur-
ing and following emergency events. As a changing global climate produces increasingly volatile 
weather patterns, New York City is likely to experience extreme weather events with more fre-
quency and greater intensity, accounting for recurrent disruptions to the safe and effi  cient trans-
portation systems upon which New Yorkers habitually rely.
From September 11th through Superstorm Sandy, ferries have consistently proven to be the most 
resilient and adaptive mode of transportation. Typically the fi rst form of transit to resume service 
following an emergency event, and the most fl exible to allow for the development of new routes 
to hard-hit, transit-poor neighborhoods, ferries must be defi ned as essential emergency man-
agement assets, and New York City must engage in long-term preparedness planning to ensure 
its coastline is suffi  ciently equipped to facilitate waterborne emergency response. To eff ect these 
critical changes, MWA recommends expanding citywide ferry service, redefi ning ferry crews as 
emergency personnel and compensating them following the fulfi llment of emergency response 
duties, integrating ferries into the City’s public transit network, and equipping the City with the 
ferry assets necessary to facilitate speedy and effi  cient waterborne emergency response and re-
covery. MWA also proposes that the City seek funding for capital improvements through federal 
emergency management grants and coordinate long-term waterfront emergency management 
issues through a dedicated division within a newly created Department of the Waterfront. In em-
bracing ferries as fundamental to waterborne emergency management, and incorporating them 
into long-term emergency planning processes, New York City can develop a waterfront that is re-
silient to the challenging new realities of the 21st-century metropolis.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: # e Role of Ferries in Emergency Events
Emergency Event Role of Ferries
September 11, 2001 " e fall of the Twin Towers necessitated the largest waterborne evacuation in histo-
ry. For two years following the attacks, more than a dozen new ferry routes crossed 
the harbor to accommodate increased demand in the absence of PATH service.⁴²
2003 Northeast Blackout With power out for 50 million customers from Michigan to Massachusetts, New York 
City’s subways, streetlights, and traffi  c signals failed. In the absence of rail and road 
transit, demand for ferry service increased more than fi vefold, with NY Waterway 
transporting about 170,000 people to New Jersey.⁴³
2005 Transit Strike With MTA employees on strike for three days in late December 2005, ferries became 
among the only mass-transit option for entry to and exit from Manhattan. " e City 
extended service, and ferries saw a ridership uptick of roughly 50%.⁴⁴
Miracle on the Hudson 
(2009)
When US Airways Flight 1529 struck a fl ock of geese, it was forced to make an 
emergency landing in the middle of the Hudson River. A fl eet of NY Waterway fer-
ries raced to the fallen plane and safely rescued all 155 passengers on board.⁴⁵
Superstorm Sandy (2012) With many subway lines out of service for a week, and some commuter rails out for 
longer, ferries helped restore mobility to neighborhoods across the City.
Appendix 2: Climate Change Projections for New York City⁴⁶
1971-2000
(Baseline)
2020s 2050s 2080s
Air Temperature 55°F +1.5–3°F +3–5°F +4–7.5°F
Precipitation 46.5 inches +0–5% +0–10% +5–10%
Sea Level Rise NA +2–5 inches +7–12 inches +12–23 inches
Rapid Ice-Melt Sea Level Rise NA +5–10 inches +19–29 inches +41–55 inches
Number of Days/Year with 
Temps over 90°F
14 23–29 29–45 37–64
1-in-100 Year Flood to Occur, 
on Average
Once every 100 
years
Once every 65–80 
years
Once every 35–55 
years
Once every 15–35 
years
42. New York City Economic Development Corporation, Comprehensive Citywide Ferry Study, 161.
43. Ibid. 
44. New York City Department of Transportation. 2005 Transit Strike: Transportation Impacts and Analysis. (New York: Department of 
Transportation, 2006),  6.
45. McFadden, “Jetliner’s Icy Plunge.”
46. New York City Panel on Climate Change. “Climate Risk Information.” New York, 2009, accessed March 6, 2013. http://www.nyc.
gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf .
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47. Kaufman, et. al., Transportation During and After Hurricane Sandy, 7. 
48. New York City Economic Development Corporation, New Rockaway Ferry Service.
49. New York City Department of Transportation. Great Kills Ferry.
Appendix 3: Superstorm Sandy Transit Timeline⁴⁷
Date Transit status
Sun., Oct. 28 MTA orders preemptive shutdown of subways and buses. Commuter rails suspend 
service.
Mon.–Tues., Oct. 29–30 Superstorm Sandy makes landfall in New Jersey. Subway service remains suspended 
indefi nitely, and all river crossings (with the exception of the Lincoln Tunnel) close. 
Wed., Oct. 31 NY Waterway resumes partial service between New Jersey and Manhattan. Signifi cant 
overcrowding is reported on buses and bridges.
# urs., Nov. 1 East River Ferry service resumes. MTA restores partial subway service.
Fri., Nov. 2 Staten Island Ferry restores service. Limited subway service accounts for severe over-
crowding on functioning lines. Long waits seen at gas stations.
Sat., Nov. 3 Subway system 80% operational.
Tues., Nov. 6 PATH resumes limited service.
# urs., Nov. 8 Most commuter rail (including Metro-North and LIRR) resumes service.
Mon., Nov. 12 Emergency ferry service begins operation between Rockaway Park and Manhattan.⁴⁸
Tues., Nov. 13 Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel partially reopens to traffi  c.
Fri., Nov. 16 Queens-Midtown Tunnel reopens to traffi  c.
Mon., Nov. 26 Emergency ferry service begins operation between Great Kills and Manhattan.⁴⁹
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